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Abstract Empirical evidence on productivity differences between family owned and non-
family owned firms is still sparse and reveals conflicting results. Unlike previous studies, 
we analyse the effect of the firm’s life cycle on productivity using a large sample of non-
listed firms. Furthermore, we consider a model with heterogeneity of inputs between the 
two types of firms and addressing possible endogeneity problems. We conclude that 
there are no significant differences in productivity between family and non-family firms, 
for both startup/growth and mature stages of life cycle.  Furthermore, labour seems to 
be the main determinant of family firms’ productivity, which is especially evident for 
firms in the mature stage. 
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Propiedad, productividad y ciclo de vida las empresas 
 
Resumen La evidencia empírica sobre las diferencias de productividad entre las empresas 
familiares y no familiares es aún escasa y revela resultados contradictorios. A diferencia 
de estudios anteriores, analizamos el efecto del ciclo de vida de la empresa en la 
productividad utilizando una gran muestra de empresas no cotizadas. Además, 
consideramos un modelo con heterogeneidad de aportes entre los dos tipos de empresas 
y abordando posibles problemas de endogeneidad. Concluimos que no hay diferencias 
significativas en la productividad entre las empresas familiares y no familiares, tanto 
para el inicio / crecimiento como para las etapas maduras del ciclo de vida. Además, la 
mano de obra parece ser el principal determinante de la productividad de las empresas 
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Introduction 
The relation between firm ownership and 
performance is a growing topic in the literature; 
see inter alia Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga 
and Amit, 2006; Chrisman et al., 2004; Arosa et 
al., 2010. However, few researchers have studied 
the impact of family ownership on the 
fundamental driver of performance, which is 
productivity. Standing out, among others in this 
group, are the studies by Martikainen et al. (2009) 
and Palia and Lichtenberg (1999) about quoted 
firms and those by Barbera and Moores (2013), 
Morikawa (2013), Barth et al. (2005) and Bosworth 
and Loundes (2002), which considered small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).  
SMEs account for 99.8% of all firms in the European 
Union (European Commission, 2015), of which 70% 
to 80% are family firms (Mandl, 2008). The 
importance of these firms for economic and social 
development justifies carrying out more studies 
about the determinants of performance, as is the 
case of productivity. 
The central objective of this paper is to provide 
further evidence on whether family ownership has 
a positive or negative effect on productivity and 
how it changes along the firms’ life cycle, as well 
as on the contribution of production factors. In 
particular, we aim to provide answers to the 
following questions: Do family owned firms display 
higher productivity than non-family firms?; Do 
labour and capital factors contribute equally to 
production in family firms than in non-family 
firms?; Do productivity differences between family 
owned and non-family owned firms change along 
the different life-cycle stages? 
We consider the case of Portugal, which, 
according to the European pattern, has a high 
percentage of family firms, representing around 
two thirds of total turnover and 50% of 
employment (Mandl, 2008). We use a large sample 
of non-listed manufacturing firms (from the SABI 
database, provided by Bureau van Dijk).  Besides 
being the first and the largest empirical study on 
productivity in family firms in Portugal, our 
approach differs from previous studies in other 
aspects. 
Firstly, this study contributes to family firm 
literature by investigating the effect of a firms’ 
life cycle on productivity differences between 
family and non-family owned firms. Empirical 
evidence in these topics is not common.  Studies 
on family firms’ productivity typically focus on the 
impact of the ownership on productivity without 
considering differences along the firms’ life-cycle 
(e.g. Barbera and Moores, 2013, Mannarino et al., 
2011). On the other hand, studies about firms’ 
life-cycle focus on its effects on property control 
(e.g. Frank et al., 2012), on the evolution of firms’ 
performance (Sridharan and Joshi, 2016) as well as 
on financial problems (Rocca et al., 2011). As far 
as we know, no previous study has analysed the 
differences in productivity along firms’ life-cycle 
stages between family and non-family firms.  
Secondly, this study presents a methodological 
contribution by not assuming homogeneity of 
inputs and by considering a recent method to 
address endogeneity problems in the estimation of 
the production function. In fact, unlike most 
empirical analyses about productivity in family 
firms, we do not assume homogeneity of inputs in 
the production functions (one exception is Barbera 
and Moores, 2013), that is, that labour and capital 
output contributions for both types of firms are 
the same. Hence, possible differences in the 
output contribution of production inputs between 
family firms and non-family firms are considered.  
Also, in general, previous research does not fully 
address endogeneity problems in estimation of the 
production function, particularly endogeneity due 
to simultaneity between the choice of inputs and 
productivity shocks. In this work, we take into 
account endogeneity by employing the method 
proposed by Wooldridge (2009).  To the best of our 
knowledge, no previous study on family owned 
firms’ productivity has employed this method to 
consider endogeneity problems. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as 
follows. The second section presents a literature 
review about the impact of firm ownership on 
performance, taking as reference the differences 
between family and non-family firms identified in 
the literature. Based on this review, hypotheses 
are formulated about the difference in 
productivity and in the contribution of production 
factors between family and non-family firms, 
along the life-cycle. The third section describes 
the empirical methodology and discusses the data 
used in the analysis. The fourth section reports 
and analyses our empirical findings. The final 
section concludes (the paper). 
Background and Hypotheses 
Evidence of the impact of ownership on 
productivity is scarce and results have not been 
consensual. Researchers focusing on quoted firms 
mainly report a positive effect of family ownership 
on productivity (e.g. Górriz and Fumas, 1996; 
Martikainen et al., 2009).  The results about the 
impact of family ownership in studies considering 
only non-listed firms or both quoted and non-listed 
firms, reveal that the effect on productivity is 
either insignificant or negative (Barbera and 
Moores, 2013, Bosworth and Loundes, 2002, Barth 
et al., 2005; Mannarino et al., 2011). 
Most studies assume input homogeneity 
(specifically labour and capital) between family 
and non-family firms. Only two studies have 
considered that firms may diverge in the use and 
contribution to output of production factors, 
because of their different concerns, objectives, 
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motivations and behaviour. The results of 
Martikainen et al. (2009) for quoted firms in the 
US show no significant differences in production 
technologies and the authors conclude that the 
higher production efficiency of family owned firms 
is caused by their more efficient use of labour and 
capital resources. On the contrary, Barbera and 
Moores (2013), considering Australian SMEs, 
conclude that these two types of firms differ in 
the use of capital and labour factors.  
Considering the specific characteristics of family 
firms resulting from the strong inter-relationship 
between family and business, we can expect 
differences in their objectives1 and in the 
strategies for allocating resources. These 
differences are related to the emotional context, 
family values, altruism and the alignment of 
objectives that characterize family firms’ 
management which do not occur in other firms. 
In this respect, differences in human resource 
management practices stand out. The literature 
suggests that family firms adopt less 
professionalized practices (De Kok, Uhlamer at al., 
2006), prefer informal training (Kotey and Folker, 
2007) and pay lower salaries, but provide greater 
job security (Bassassini et al., 2013). This 
informality in the decision process, as well as the 
adoption of more long-term perspectives (Harris 
and Reid, 2008) and the family atmosphere of 
trust and cohesion associated with a policy of 
conservative payment, contribute to motivate 
employees and increase labour productivity. 
These management characteristics relate to the 
model of governance adopted by family firms. 
Based on great dedication to the continuity of the 
business, creating a culture of community with 
employees and close connections with clients, 
Miller et al. (2008) and Miller and Le Breton-Miller 
(2006) showed that the stewardship theory model 
is applicable to family firm governance.  
The overlap between ownership and management 
may lead to the absence of agency costs linked to 
control. At the same time, it ensures close 
alignment between family and firm interests and a 
policy of lower salaries explained by the emotional 
link between managers/owners and firms. This 
leads to the creation of a climate of informality 
and employees’ great proximity to family 
members, which favours involvement (Mandl, 
2008), commitment (Azoury et al., 2013) and 
employee satisfaction (Huang et al., 2015; Block 
et al., 2013). Given these specific characteristics 
and the difficulty of replicating them in non-family 
firms, they may be an important competitive 
advantage for family firms. 
																																								 																				
1 Often, maximizing family well-being does not coincide with 
business objectives. For example, non-monetary objectives 
such as satisfaction with the transfer of ownership to 
descendants may prevent making a highly-profitable 
investment due to the added risk this represents for the family 
firm. 
Considering top management, the results about 
the relationship between the presence of a family 
CEO and performance are ambiguous, although 
most recent studies point towards a negative 
relationship. For example, Anderson and Reeb 
(2003) confirm better performance of family 
member CEOs because they understand the 
business and behave as stewards of the firm. 
However, Villalonga and Amit (2006) and Pérez-
González (2007) identify lower performance of 
family member CEOs, explained by the smaller 
recruitment base of family firms. In turn, 
Bennedsen et al. (2007) show that the presence of 
family CEOs has an extremely negative causal 
effect on firm performance, whereas external 
CEOs have the opposite effect. As the literature 
suggests family firms are generally reluctant to 
take on external CEOs in order to prevent a loss of 
control (Gómez-Mejía et al. 2011) and that family 
member CEOs remain in the post much longer than 
their non-family equivalents (Gómez-Mejía et al., 
2001), irrespective of the results obtained, we 
may expect less efficient top management in 
family firms. 
Considering the characteristics of human resources 
management previously discussed and the results 
of Barbera and Moores (2013), concluding that the 
labour factor in family firms contributes 
significantly more to production, we may expect 
greater efficiency of the labour factor in family 
firms. To confirm this assumption, we test the 
following null hypothesis: 
H1: There is a greater contribution of the labour 
factor to production in family firms than in non-
family firms. 
Family firms may also show a different 
contribution of capital. In fact, Barbera and 
Moores (2013) conclude that the capital factor 
contributes significantly less to production than in 
non-family firms. This difference can be explained 
by the characteristics of capital structure and 
investment decisions. Schmid (2013) identified the 
desire to keep control and avoid excessive risk as 
the main determinants of financing decisions. Most 
studies confirm that family firms are more risk 
averse (Hiebl, 2013) and that this criterion is very 
important in the investment decision (Anderson et 
al., 2012).  
Despite the great amount of research, the 
literature about the differences in capital 
structure remains inconclusive (Ampenberger et 
al., 2013). Some studies identified greater debt in 
family firms (e.g. Croci et al., 2011; King and 
Santor, 2008; and Blanco-Mazagatos et al., 2007); 
while others, such as Schmid (2013), Ampenberger 
et al. (2013) and Anderson et al. (2012) found the 
opposite result of greater debt in non-family firms. 
More important than the differences in the capital 
structure is the difference in the cost of capital. 
According to the agency theory, the overlap 
between ownership and management in family 
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firms may substantially reduce agency problems, 
which produces positive effects on the cost of 
capital (Ang et al., 2000).  However, other 
authors, such as Schulze et al. (2001) or Schulze et 
al. (2003), argue that significant agency costs may 
occur as a result of inefficient behaviour and 
conflicts among family owners. 
The effects of greater risk aversion in family firms 
were analysed in the scope of agency theory by Le 
Breton-Miller and Miller (2009), who concluded on 
under-investment in the area of business renewal 
and innovation. A growing number of studies 
demonstrate that family firms invest less in R&D 
than non-family ones (Patel and Chrisman, 2014; 
Block, 2012; and Munari et al., 2010) due to the 
greater risk and the desire to preserve 
socioemotional wealth2. 
Although most studies assume homogeneity of the 
capital factor in the production function, 
considering the differences in the financial 
decisions previously discussed and the result of 
Barbera and Moores (2013), we can expect less 
efficiency of this factor in family firms, and hence 
we test the following null hypothesis: 
H2: There is a lower contribution of the capital 
factor to production in family firms than in non-
family firms. 
The theoretical prepositions and empirical results 
about the differences between family and non-
family firms discussed above also affect the firms’ 
productivity. Like Barbera and Moores (2013), we 
want to investigate the effect of family ownership 
on productivity. This can be explained by the 
resource-based view, which states that family 
firms have unique capabilities, resources and 
relationships that non-family firms cannot 
develop. Families may influence firm performance 
due to the interaction of these family factors with 
business variables (Habbershon and Williams, 
1999; Habbershon et al., 2003; Sirmon and Hitt, 
2003). This interaction between the family and 
productive activities can generate strategic 
resources, which are themselves sources of 
competitive advantages. 
On the contrary, family firms’ financing 
preferences can have a negative effect on 
competitiveness. These companies prefer to 
generate funds internally (Blanco-Mazgatos et al. 
2007, Romano et al. 2001) as opposed to external 
financing, so as to avoid risk and sharing control 
(e.g., Coutts, 2005; DGPYME, 2003). This choice 
affects the availability of capital and investment 
and can affect competitiveness if it results in using 
obsolete equipment because of the difficulty in 
replacing it. As this problem does not arise to the 
same extent in non-family firms, it can create 
																																								 																				
2 Gómez-Mejía et al. (2007) defined socioemotional wealth as 
“non-financial aspects of the firm that meet the family’s 
affective needs, such as identity, the ability to exercise family 
influence, and the perpetuation of the family dynasty”. 
differences in competitiveness between these two 
types of firm. 
The factors previously discussed and the 
governance model, more oriented to the use of 
control mechanisms, as predicted by agency 
theory, determine a firm’s productivity. These 
features have impact on the objectives and on the 
management of resources, affecting firms’ 
efficiency in several different ways. Hence, all 
together these effects have an impact on 
productivity, which leads us to test the difference 
between family and non-family firms by studying 
the following hypothesis: 
H3: Taking into account different input 
contributions, there is no difference in 
productivity between family and non-family firms. 
Our work differs from previous studies by 
considering the hypothesis of differences in 
productivity along a firms’ life cycle. These 
differences can be explained by the factors 
described above related to financing and growth 
or to the change in strategic orientation.  (e.g. 
Molly et al., 2012; Martin and Lumpkin, 2004). This 
analysis is based on a vision of firm’s life-cycle, 
which begins with the founder’s strong control of 
ownership that gradually dwindles over time. 
At the initial start-up stage, the characteristics of 
entrepreneurs and businesses are very similar. 
There is a vision towards business, ideas, 
intellectual capital and growth opportunities 
(Hand, 2005). Founders typically hold a significant 
part of ownership and remain in power for many 
years. Founders’ personal characteristics are 
common to both types of firms3, with priority 
given to entrepreneurial activity and building the 
business rather than the role as a member of the 
family (Miller et al., 2013). 
As the characteristics previously described do not 
show substantial differences between the two 
types of firms in the start-up/growth stage, we 
can accept at the outset that there is no 
difference in productivity. To confirm this 
assumption, we test the following hypothesis 
H4: There is no difference in productivity between 
family owned firms in start-up/growth stage and 
non-family firms on the same stage. 
Given the differences is time perspectives for 
family firms assumed by James (1999), who states 
that these firms favour long term strategies, and 
the findings of Mandl (2008), who confirms that 
family firms give priority to long term 
sustainability and to the challenges of ownership 
and management transfer, we cannot expect the 
previous hypothesis to be true in other stages of 
firms’ life-cycle.  
The literature identifies management problems in 
more advanced stages of the family firms life-
																																								 																				
3 Martin and Lumpkin (2004) provide an extensive analysis of 
the meaning of business orientation and the personal 
characteristics of entrepreneurs. 
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cycle, which often results from ownership transfer 
to descendants (e.g. Molly et al., 2010 ; Villalonga 
and Amit, 2006). In particular, these problems are 
related with increased conflict between family 
members (e.g. Eddleston and Kellermanns, 2007), 
less business talent and fewer management 
competences (e.g. Cucculelli and Micucci, 2008), 
less work capacity and lower ethics in descendants 
(Morck and Yeung, 2003) and the lack of financial 
resources (Miller and Le Bretton-Miller, 2006 and 
Upton and Petty, 2000). 
Other studies justify stagnation with the 
diminishing entrepreneurial orientation in 
subsequent generations of family firms (Martin and 
Lumpkin, 2004). Zellweger and Sieger (2012) 
concluded that ownership transfer to descendants 
has a negative impact on internal autonomy and 
innovation, and the opposite effect on pro-
activeness and competitive aggressiveness. This 
maybe also justified by the fact that leaders 
remain in their positions longer in family firms, as 
identified by Brenes et al. (2011) and McConaughy 
(2000).  
This evolution, which is not common in non-family 
firms4, is described in the literature as a change in 
strategic orientation – from the entrepreneurial 
perspective of business renewal to a conservative 
vision of greater risk aversion and giving priority to 
protecting the family (e.g. Martin and Lumpkin, 
2004 and Molly et al., 2010). Family orientation 
prioritizes stability and preservation of the family 
heritage rather than the competitive 
aggressiveness that characterizes business 
orientation (Martin and Lumpkin, 2004), which 
authors such as Lumpkin and Dess (2001) found to 
be closely related to performance. 
According to Chrisman et al. (2008), an important 
distinction between family and non-family firms 
lies in how they formulate and implement 
strategies and how these affect performance. The 
strategic change previously discussed may 
generate both positive and negative effects on 
productivity in mature stage family firms that do 
not occur in non-family ones. No previous studies 
have investigated the possible differences 
between the two types of firm in mature stages. 
However, given the expected differences in 
strategies, we test the following hypothesis: 
H5: Family firms in mature stage have lower 
productivity than non-family firms in the same 
stage. 
Methodology and Data 
Empirical Methodology 
																																								 																				
4 In non-family firms, the ownership/management transfer is 
seen as less of a question of renewal, where rationality prevails 
and the objective is to increase performance. In family firms it 
is a critical decision that involves principally emotion and can 
represent discontinuity (Stewart, 2003).  
As previous studies, the empirical analysis is based 
on a standard Cobb-Douglas production function: 
 
 Yit = β0 + β1lit + β2Kit +ϖ it + ε it                 
         
Where  Yit  is the logarithm of the Added Value of 
firm i  at time t ,  Kit  is the log of capital, itl  is 
the log of labour,  ε it  is a standard error term and 
 ϖ it  represents firms’ productivity, which is 
assumed to be observed by the firm but not by the 
econometrician.   
OLS estimation of the previous equation requires 
all inputs to be exogenous. However, it is 
commonly assumed that labour is an input that can 
adjust more rapidly than capital when the firm 
faces a productivity shock.  Therefore, labour is 
considered a freely variable factor and capital a 
state variable. As labour adjusts to current 
productivity shocks, OLS estimation of the 
production function provides biased estimates. In 
fact, we have an endogeneity bias due to 
simultaneity, that is, firms know productivity at 
the time they choose their inputs and it is likely 
that an increase in productivity will lead to an 
increase in labour.  
Consequently, several alternative estimators have 
been suggested in the literature to overcome 
endogeneity5. It has been recognized that 
traditional methods like fixed-effects estimation 
techniques, despite taking firm heterogeneity into 
account, do not solve the simultaneity problem 
when productivity shocks change over time.  
Similarly, instrumental variables methods have a 
number of problems, particularly related to the 
difficulty of finding appropriate instruments. In 
fact, in general, both fixed-effects and 
instrumental variables methods seem to provide 
unreliable estimators (Ackerberg et al., 2007).  
The latest solutions to deal with this problem 
extend the semi-parametric approach of Olley and 
Pakes (1996), such as the estimators of Levinsohn 
and Petrin (2003) or Ackerberg et al. (2006). All 
these authors suggested two-step methods using 
proxies for unobserved productivity shocks. 
More recently, Wooldridge (2009) proposed a 
single-step method, estimating the first and 
second stage of previously suggested methods 
simultaneously, within a GMM framework. 
Wooldridge (2009) argues that this alternative is 
more efficient as, unlike the two-step approaches, 
it takes into account potential contemporaneous 
correlation in the errors across the two equations 
(corresponding to the two steps) and it allows for 
serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in the 
error terms.  In this paper the Wooldridge (2009) 
approach is adopted.  
																																								 																				
5 See Van Beveren  (2012) for surveys on the various methods. 
(1)
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As in Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) or Olley and 
Pakes (1996), a proxy for productivity shocks 
(materials or investment) is needed. Considering 
materials as a proxy, the demand for this 
intermediate input is assumed to depend on the 
firm´s capital  (Kt ) and the productivity shock  ω t : 
 mt = f (Kt ,ω t )                    
This  function  can  be inverted  if the 
monotonicity condition is met and materials are 
increasing in  ω t : 
 ω it = g(Kit ,mit )            
By using  (3) we can rewrite the equation (1) as: 
 Yit = β0 + β1lit + β2Kit + g(Kit ,mit )+ ε it   (4)
                                           
Further, the dynamics of productivity shocks is 
restricted by assuming:  
 
Et−1{ϖ it | Kit ,lit−1,ϖ it−1, Kit−1,mit−1,....,li1, Ki1,mi1}=
= Et−1{ϖ it |ϖ it−1}= f [g(Kit−1,mit−1)]         
   
  
Plugging,  ϖ it = f [g(Kit−1,mit−1)]+ vit  into equation 
(1), we get a second equation: 
 
 Yit = β0 + β1lit + β2Kit + f [g(Kit−1,mit−1)]+ vit + ε it         
To estimate the model and to identify both 1β  
and 2β  we need to specify functions ( )g ⋅  and 
( )f ⋅ . These can be approximated by a 
polynomial of  the third degree or less. In this 
paper a polynomial of the third degree for ( )g ⋅ and 
of the first degree for ( )f ⋅ is chosen, further 
assuming that productivity follows a random walk 
with drift. In this case, the following system of 
equations is to be estimated in a GMM framework: 
 
Yit = β0 + β1lit + β2Kit + g(Kit ,mit )+ ε it





          
The above equations have different sets of 
instruments, where the lag length of instruments 
is limited to one period. Specifically, for the first 
equation the instruments are labour, capital and a 
third degree polynomial of capital and materials, 
and for the second equation, lagged labour, 
capital and a third degree polynomial of lagged 
capital and lagged materials.   
Since the objective is to analyse productivity 
differences between family firms and non-family 
firms, in the empirical analysis the standard Cobb-
Douglas production function (1) is extended in 
several ways.  First, a dummy variable (family), 
taking the value of one for a family firm and zero 
otherwise, is introduced. Second, to take into 
consideration possible differences in capital and 
labour inputs between family owned and non-
family owned firms, interactions between the 
dummy variable of family and inputs are also 
included. Moreover, a set of dummy variables to 
control the industrial sector, year and region is 
introduced.  
Therefore, the following extended version of the 
Cobb-Douglas production function is considered: 
 
 
Yit = β0 + γ family + β1lit + β2Kit +
+β3 family.lit + β4 family.Kit +δ Xit +ϖ it + ε it
        
Where itX stands for the control variables. The 
system of equations (7) as well as the set of 
instruments changed accordingly. In both 
equations the control variables act as their own 
instruments. 
Data  
Data from the SABI (Analysis System of Iberian 
Balance Sheets) database supplied by Bureau van 
Dijk is used. This is considered to be a 
representative dataset of the Portuguese firms, 
containing financial information for all industrial 
sectors and that is commonly used in studies about 
industry. Our study focuses on the manufacturing 
sector (similarly to Palia and Lichtenberg, 1999 or 
Martikainen et al., 2009) including non-listed firms 
for the period 2006 to 2009 located in mainland 
Portugal. We chose to consider data up to 2009, as 
this is the year before the external adjustment 
programme started in Portugal. The economic 
crisis, which has shaken the country since 2009, 
could in fact affect the results. 
The sample includes firms that present positive 
values for all the variables used in the study for at 
least one year. Moreover, exit and entry of new 
firms is allowed, which implies that the sample 
includes firms that survived over the entire period 
of analysis and those that did not. Therefore, the 
final sample contains a total of 18,981 firms in 
2006 and an unbalanced panel between 2006 and 
2009 (due to free entry and exit of firms, but also 
to missing values in the variables used) comprising 
a total of 75,365 observations6. 
																																								 																				
6 We have checked for the existence of outliers using several 
procedures. Only six observations were classified as possible 
outliers. However, we performed regressions with and without 
outliers and found no significant differences in the coefficient 
estimates. Therefore, we have considered all the observations 
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One key aspect in the study is how to identify 
family owned firms. The literature contains a 
variety of definitions of a family business and 
there is no consensus among researchers (López-
Gracia and Sánchez-Andújar, 2007). In general, 
three main criteria define a family firm. The first 
is based on who takes the most important 
management decisions (Filbeck and Lee, 2000), 
the second relates to capital ownership (Donckels 
and Lambrecht, 1999), and finally the last 
criterion is based on the possibility of passing the 
business to future generations (McConaughy and 
Phillips, 1999). 
As in other studies, the availability of data limits 
the decision on which criteria to use. In this study 
capital ownership is considered and a similar 
criterion to the one used by López-Gracia and 
Sánchez-Andújar (2007) is followed.  Hence, family 
firms are those with a shareholder, single or 
family, who owns more than 50% of the total 
shares, for each year of the time period. 
Consequently, in our sample around 74% of the 
observations are family firms (55,804) and more 
than 70% are micro firms. These percentages are 
according to the structure of the Portuguese 
manufacturing sector (Banco de Portugal, 2016). 
The importance of family firms is also similar to 
other studies that have analysed family business 
performance considering non-listed firms for other 
countries (Arosa et al., 2010; Chrisman et al. 
2004).  
In the empirical analysis, as dependent variable 
measuring firm output, the logarithmic of the 
Added Value (lnAV)7 is used. Labour input (in 
logarithms -lnlabour) is measured by the number 
of employees, as hours of work per employee are 
not available in the dataset.  
Capital input (also in logarithms- lncapital) is 
proxied by the sum of equity and debt8 (following 
Barth et al, 2005). Due to many missing 
observations for the investment variable in the 
data, causing the loss of a large number of 
observations, the logarithm of input materials 
(lnmaterials) is used as a proxy variable for 
productivity shocks in the Wooldridge (2009) 
method. To deflate monetary values the 
appropriate producer price index for each 
manufacturing industry is used, and therefore all 
variables are at 2005 prices. The price indices are 
taken from the National Institute of Statistics (INE- 
http://www.ine.pt).   
In order to control for possible industry bias, 
following most previous authors, 22 dummy 
variables are included to control for heterogeneity 
across industry sectors for manufacturing (one 
dummy variable for each two-digit level of the 
																																								 																				
7 Several authors, such as Barth et al (2005) or Mannarino et al. 
(2011), have also considered the same measure for output. 
8 Other proxies were also considered (sum of equity and total 
liabilities) but the conclusions were not affected. 
Portuguese Standard Industrial Classification 
system – CAE- which is correlated with Eurostat 
Nace Rev.2 taxonomy. Repair and installation of 
machinery and equipment is the reference 
category)9. Also, 4 regional dummies (North, 
Centre, Alentejo and Algarve. Lisbon is the 
reference category) and year dummies are 
introduced. 
To study productivity differences along the 
different stages of the firms’ life cycle, we follow 
Mandl (2008) classification: start-up/growth, 
mature and declining stages. In this paper we 
focus on the first two stages and according to 
studies such as that of Gersick et al. (1997), 
Blanco-Mazagatos et al. (2007) and Santarelli and 
Lotti (2005), we consider firms with 25 years of 
age or less in the start-up / growth phase. 
Thus, our sample was divided into two groups. The 
group of firms with 25 years of age or less (start-
up/growth stage) and firms over 25 years of age 
that are in the mature stage. In our sample, the 
majority of both family and non-family firms are 
25 years old or less. In fact, in 2006 about 84% of 
family firms are in the start-up/growth stage 
whereas only about 68,7% of non-family firms are 
in the same stage. 
As we can see in Table 1, there are indeed 
significant differences in the main characteristics 
between firms in start-up/growth stage and 
mature firms. These results justify an analysis on 
the differences in productivity between family and 
non-family firms across different firms’ stages. 
Table 1   Comparison between start-up/growth and mature 














lnAV 11.578     1.404     12.431     1.682    -65.22* 




9.781         
1.447 
2.024         
13.524 
10.746         
1.753  





59405 15960  
    Notes:  T statistics: tests difference in means between start-
up/growth and mature firms. 
*Significant at 1% level 
 
Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics for the 
main variables for both family and non-family 
firms and for firms in the two stages. Tests for 
differences in means between family and non-
family firms reveal that the two types of firms are 
significantly different in all variables. Family firms 
present lower averages in Added Value and 
capital, as well as fewer employees than non-
family firms and less capital. Family firms also 
																																								 																				
9 Tobacco products were not included as no family firms are 
present in this sector. 
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show lower levels of intermediate inputs 
(lnmaterials).  
The conclusion that family firms are smaller is 
consistent with previous studies on family 
business, such as Mannarino et al. (2011), 
Martikeinen et al. (2009) or Barbera and Moores 
(2013).  In all variables, family firms show less 
dispersion than non-family firms. 
 
Table 2.  Family and Non-Family Firms: descriptive statistics 






Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. 
Dev. 
T-statistic 
lnAV 11.471 1.313 12.576 1.715 93.09* 
lnlabour 2.050 1.022 2.877 1.321 89.86* 
lncapital 12.468 1.324 13.664 1.840 97.51* 
lnmaterials 9.691 1.946 10.824 2.196 67.72* 
Total 
observations 
55804   19561 	 	
	 Family Firms start-
up / growth stage 
Non-Family Firms start-
up/growth stage 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. 
Dev. 
T-statistic 
lnAV 11.368 0.006 12.315 0.014 71.07* 
lnlabour 1.962 0.005 2.651 0.011 67.05* 
Incapital 12.351 0.006 13.378 0.015 75.14* 
Inmaterials 9.562 0.009 10.548 0.019 50.31* 
Total 
observations 
46254  13151   
 Family Firms 
mature stage  
Non-Family Firms mature 
stage  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. 
Dev. 
T-statistic 
lnAV 11.973 0.015 13.113 0.022 44.50* 
lnlabour 2.477 0.012 3.340 0.017 43.58* 
Incapital 13.037 0.015 14.249	 0.023 45.55* 
Inmaterials 10.315 0.019 11.390 0.027 33.13* 
Total 
observations 
9550   6410     
 Notes:  T statistics: tests difference in means between family 
and non-family firms. 
*Significant at 1% level 
 
 
Analysis of Results 
Table 3 presents the coefficient estimates for the 
production function considering both homogeneity 
and heterogeneity of inputs, for all firms and also 
for start-up/growth stage firms and mature stage 
firms. All specifications include industry, year and 
regional controls, which are globally significant in 
explaining firm productivity. However, these are 
not reported due to the large number of 
coefficients.  
Unlike previous studies, the possible bias of 
estimates due to correlation between input levels 
and unobserved productivity is explicitly 
considered, by using the Wooldridge (2009) 
approach. Indeed, tests confirm there is an 
endogeneity problem in all the specifications (see 
Table 3) and therefore OLS estimates are not 
consistent.  
Analysing first all the firms’ stages together and 
homogeneity of inputs, we conclude that the 
elasticities’ estimates are very similar to other 
studies, such as Barth et al. (2005) and Barbera 
and Moores (2013), and we may reject the 
hypothesis of constant returns to scale. The 
possibility of differences in the coefficient inputs 
between family and non-family firms is considered 
by introducing two interactions between the 
dummy variable of family and each of the inputs 
in specification (2). The results show important 
differences in inputs between family and non-
family firms. Indeed, for family firms capital 
seems to contribute less to total output while 
labour makes a larger contribution than for non-
family firms. These findings are in line with the 
conclusions of Barbera and Moores (2013) about 
input differences between these two types of 
firms, and are also in accordance with our 
hypotheses H1 and H2.  
To compare productivity performance between 
family and non-family firms, the key variable is 
the dummy family. Considering both homogeneity 
and heterogeneity of inputs, there is a negative 
but not significant coefficient for the family 
variable, which suggests that family firms are not 
more productive than non-family firms. Therefore, 
these results are according to previous findings of 
Barbera and Moores (2013) and confirm our 
hypothesis H3.  
In order to study possible differences along the 
firms’ life cycle we estimate separate regressions 
for the two firms’ stages. Our findings suggest that 
there are no significant productivity differences 
between family firms and non-family firms for 
both start-up/growth stage and mature stage. 
Indeed, although the coefficient estimate of the 
family variable for mature firms is lower, the 
variable is always not significant. Hence, our 
results confirm our expectations that there are no 
differences in productivity between family firms 
and non-family firms for start-up/growth firms and 
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therefore confirm hypothesis H4. However, these 
findings are not according to our predictions 
regarding firms in the mature stage. Our 
hypothesis H5 was that mature family firms display 
higher productivity than other type of firms of the 
same stage, which is not confirmed in this 
analysis. Regarding the inputs coefficients, the 
contribution of the labour factor follows the same 
pattern for both start-ups and mature firms. This 
pattern is not confirmed for the use of capital. In 
fact, there are significant differences in the use of 
capital between family and non-family mature 
firms, which does not occur for start-up/growth 
ones.  
 
    Table 3  Estimation Results – Wooldridge method. 
 


































































177807.3* 185244.3* 126404.7 53267.05 
Endogeneity Test 
 




51077 51077 39469  11608 
Notes:  All specifications include yearly, regional and industry 
dummies, but are not reported. 
(*), (**) -  significant at 1% and 5 % level, respectively 
Robust Standard Errors are in parenthesis. 
These findings suggest that the characteristics of 
administration and human resource management 
practices remain constant over the life-cycle in 
both types of firm. Regarding the capital factor, 
important changes are found in mature stage 
family firms. This type of firms face a greater 
shortage of financial resources, greater risk 
aversion and a change in strategic orientation, 
which together contribute to a lower contribution 
of this factor. Moreover, in the case of family 
firms in Portugal, the labour factor determines 
their productivity and explains the fact that 
financing decisions and change in strategic 
orientation does not seem to affect their 
productivity, along their life-cycle.  
It should be also mentioned that, besides 
endogeneity due to simultaneity between input 
choice and productivity shocks, other problems 
may occur when estimating production functions 
which might affect the results. Therefore, in order 
to check for the robustness of our results we have 
performed some other regressions10.  
First, there is another possible source of 
endogeneity that comes from the fact that family 
ownership may be affected by firm performance, 
because families may only retain ownership of 
firms that perform better. Therefore, if family 
firms show higher productivity this may provide 
incentives for families to maintain control, and 
thus the analysis potentially suffers from an 
endogeneity problem.  It is likely our conclusions 
are not too much affected by this possible 
problem,  
as in the data almost all firms retain their 
ownership status over the years, which raises 
doubts about stronger performance causing family 
ownership. Other previous studies have also found 
that families keep firm ownership even in bad 
economic periods (e.g. Andres, 2008).  
Nevertheless, extra regressions were performed 
accounting for the possibility of ownership 
endogeneity, considering risk11 as an instrument 
for family ownership (following Demsetz and Lehn, 
1985). The results showed that exogeneity of the 
family variable cannot be rejected and therefore 
the conclusions are not affected by ownership 
endogeneity. This finding is in accordance with 
previous studies that controlled for the 
endogeneity of ownership (Barbera and Moores, 
2013 and Martikainen et al., 2009). 
Second, besides endogeneity, there is the 
possibility of selection problems due to firm entry 
or exit in the period of analysis. Some methods 
have been proposed to deal with this problem 
(namely Olley and Pakes, 1996).  However, authors 
such as Olley  and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and 
Petrin (2003), have argued that in practice the 
gains in efficiency from taking this problem into 
account are not significant, especially when using 
unbalanced datasets (with both surviving and non-
surviving firms). Accordingly, empirical studies 
have reported small differences in the coefficients 
after explicitly considering this problem (see for 
example Van Beveren, 2012). As in this study we 
consider an unbalanced data set, the results 
should not be too much affected by this problem.  
Yet we estimated the model considering a sample 
comprising only firms which survived over the 
entire period of analysis but the conclusions 
remained equal. 
																																								 																				
10 These results are available upon request. 
11 Following Maury (2006), the standard deviation of profit rate 
was employed as a measure of risk.	
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One other important aspect is the type of 
management in family firms, which may be an 
important factor in explaining the impact of family 
ownership on productivity.  Some previous studies 
have analysed this aspect, such as Barth et al. 
(2005), and concluded that family-owned firms 
managed by someone hired outside the owning 
family show better productivity performance. 
Unfortunately, due to data limitations, it is not 
possible to study this aspect.  
Conclusions 
The literature suggests that ownership may 
influence firm performance. Although productivity 
is an important indicator of firms’ performance, 
not many studies have analysed this issue. This 
paper offers further evidence of the relationship 
between family ownership and productivity 
performance, considering the case of the 
manufacturing sector in Portugal. In particular, we 
test several hypotheses concerning the impact of 
ownership on productivity and on input factors 
contribution for production.  First, this paper 
analyses if labour and capital factors contribute 
equally to production for both family and non-
family owned firms, considering possible 
differences along the firms’ life-cycle stages. 
Second, this work investigates whether family 
owned firms display higher productivity than non-
family firms and also if the impact of ownership 
differs along the firms’ life-cycle. Moreover, 
unlike previous studies, we take into account 
possible endogeneity problems due to simultaneity 
between input decision and productivity shocks. 
 
The results reveal that the production 
technologies of family firms and non-family firms 
are different, especially concerning the 
contribution of labour. In family firms, labour 
makes a larger contribution to total output than in 
non-family firms for both start-up/growth stage 
and mature stage firms.  As for capital, the results 
suggest that for firms in the mature stage it 
contributes less to output in the case of family 
firms than in non-family firms in the same stage, 
which does not occur for firms in start-up/growth 
stage. This result can be explained by changes in 
finance decisions and strategic orientation caused 
by efforts to keep control and solve conflicts 
among the family firms’ descendants. 
 
Regarding the effects of family ownership on 
productivity, no significant differences in 
productivity between family and non-family firms 
are found for both startups and mature firms. 
These conclusions remain stable after performing 
several robustness checks. These findings confirm 
our conjecture that, for non-listed firms, no 
differences in productivity are expected between 
family and non-family firms for firms in startup / 
growth stage. However, they do not confirm our 
expectation that there should be a difference in 
productivity between family and non-family firms 
in the mature stage. This result is explained by the 
greater contribution of the labour factor and the 
lower contribution of capital in mature stage 
family firms. These two effects combined lead to 
no differences in productivity between the mature 
stage family firms and non-family firms in the 
same stage. 
Summing up, we found no evidence of significant 
differences in productivity between family and 
non-family owned firms in the first two stages of a 
firms’ life cycle. We also confirmed the existence 
of different production technologies between 
family and non-family firms. In fact, results 
suggest that labour is the main contributing factor 
for productivity in family firms, which is especially 
notable for firms in the mature stage. 
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